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Public and private offerings of interests in limited partnerships have
become as much a part of the securities business as stock or debt offerings.
The structure of partnership offerings has been based primarily on a com-
bined application of the rules governing stock offerings, the SEC's Industry
Guides (particularly real estate and oil and gas), the rules of the National
Association of Securities Dealers (particularly Appendix F), the North Amer-
ican Securities Administrators Association's guidelines for registration of
real estate and oil and gas programs, and a substantial reliance on existing
practice in the industry. The unique problems posed by partnership offerings,
however, have resulted in an increased interest in, and development of,
certain areas of regulation. Significant recent developments have taken place
in the integration of private offerings, offering practices in all-or-none
offerings, and deferred or installment payments for subscriptions. Other
areas of particular interest in the partnership area, such as the so-called
"section 4(1-1/2) exemption"' and the need for broker-dealer registration
of associated persons of the issuer, have been the subject of substantial
discussion elsewhere that need not be repeated here.
2
II. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP INTEGRATION
The doctrine of integration, simply stated, stems from the premise that
the registration and disclosure provisions should not be circumvented by
dividing an offering into its component parts. Although each part of the
offering viewed separately may be exempt, considered as a whole the offering
does not qualify for the exemption.
The doctrine of integration historically has been applied to offerings by
corporate issuers. In recent years the doctrine has been extended to separate
offerings by a single limited partnership or to separate offerings by related
* The authors are partners in the Washington, D.C. firm of Shaw, Pittman, Potts &
Trowbridge. The authors wish to express their appreciation to Bancroft S. Gordon and Nancy
C. Wagner, associates in the firm, for their assistance in connection with the preparation of
this article.
I. See The Section "4(1-1/2)" Phenomenon: Private Resales of "Restricted Securities,"
34 Bus. LAW. 1961 (1979).
2. See Persons Deemed Not To Be Brokers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-22172 [1984-
1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,792 (June 27, 1985).
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limited partnerships, which often feature a common general partner. This
extension is inevitable given the popularity of the limited partnership as a
financing vehicle and the peculiar structural characteristics of the limited
partnership.
Considerable confusion has arisen in the extension of the integration
doctrine to the limited partnership offering. This confusion is caused by
several factors, some inherent in the integration doctrine and some peculiar
to limited partnerships. This article discusses the confusion surrounding the
integration doctrine and suggests some guidelines for applying the integration
doctrine in the context of the limited partnership offering.
A. History of the Integration Doctrine
The Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") first dealt
with what now is known as the integration doctrine in 1933 in Securities Act
Release 973 when the Commission adopted rule 152 that now reads:
Transactions by an issuer not involving a public offering in
section 4(2) shall be deemed to apply to transactions not involving
any public offering at the time of said transactions although subse-
quent thereto the issuer decides to make a public offering and/or
files a registration statement.
4
Subsequently, the Commission sought to establish more objective tests
of integration, first in its 1938 decision in Unity Gold Corporation,' and
thereafter in two releases: Securities Act Release No. 44346 and Securities
Act Release No. 4552,1 relating to section 3(a)(1 1) and section 4(2) offerings,
respectively. These releases applied the following five criteria for determining
whether or not integration applied:
(a) are the offerings part of a single plan of financing;
(b) do the offerings involve the issuance of the same class of security;
(c) are the offerings made at or about the same time;
(d) is the same type of consideration to be received; and
(e) are the offerings made for the same general purpose.
8
The Commission also has issued a number of rulings using objective
standards to interpret the various exemptions under the Securities Act of
3, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1021, 1027 (Dec. 28, 1933).
4, 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (1986).
5. 3 S.E.C. 618 (1938).
6. 1 Fed, Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 2270 (Dec. 6, 1961).
7, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2270 (Nov. 6, 1961).
8. Id. 1 2781,
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1933. For example, under the exemption in Regulation D the determination
of the exemption's availability is based largely upon objective criteria includ-
ing a six-month offering safe harbor from integration. Nevertheless, the five
criteria set forth in Securities Act Release No. 45529 remain the basic position
of the Commission.
Because of confusion in staff letters interpreting integration,' 0 the Federal
Securities Committee of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business
Law of the American Bar Association formed a task force in 1984 to study
the integration issue. Its report was published in the Business Lawyer in
January 1986."1 The Task Force recommended that rule 152 be rescinded
and replaced by a new rule 152 that would create safe harbors from the
application of integration in the following situations:
1. The offerings are made by different issuers. Securities are
deemed to be offered by different entities if (a) the offering entities
are separate legal entities with separate books and records and the
funds received by each entity are not commingled, (b) each entity
upon the offering and the receipt of the offering proceeds had an
independent opportunity to meet its primary investment objectives,
and (c) no material portion of the offering proceeds shall have been
invested in projects in which an affiliate shall have invested a material
amount of its gross offering proceeds.
2. The offerings are separated by at least six months.
3. The offerings involve different classes of securities and
immediately prior to the second offering the issuer does not have a
negative net worth and is not a development stage company. All
securities shall be deemed to fall into one of the following classes:
(a) Common Stock shall include only equity securities
with ordinary voting rights and customary dividend
rights.
(b) Preferred Stock shall include all equity securities with
a preferential right to dividends and any distribution
of net assets.
(c) Non-Secured Debt shall include all unsecured and non-
guaranteed debt.
(d) Secured Debt shall include all non-subordinated in-
debtedness secured by a bona fide mortgage or secu-
rity interest or assets.
9. Id.
10. See Clover Financial Corp., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,091
(April 5, 1979) (announcing that SEC staff would no longer issue no-action letters involving
integration doctrine because of confusion in existing staff letters interpreting integration).
11. See Integration of Securities Offerings: Report of the Task Force on Integration, 41
Bus. LAw. 595 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Report of ABA Task Force on Integration].
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(e) Hybrid Securities include all securities which do not
fall within the above categories.
Convertible securities and stock warrants or options are deemed to
include the security into which they are convertible or exercisable.
4. The offerings are effected for different purposes. For this
purpose all offerings are deemed to have been undertaken for one
or more of the following purposes: (a) to raise capital; (b) to
extinguish indebtedness through an exchange of securities; (c) to
secure human resources; or (d) to acquire business operations or
assets; and in determining whether an offering is for the purpose of
acquiring assets or for raising capital, the offering shall be deemed
to be for any purpose for which more than 25% of the proceeds of
the offering are intended to be used or are used.
5. The offering satisfies section 3(a)(10) or, if effected by an
issuer whose securities are registered under section 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and which has filed all reports required by sec-
tion 13 of such Act during the preceding 12 months, satisfies the re-
quirements of section 3(a)(9).
No offering of securities shall be integrated with:
1. An offering registered under the Securities Act of 1933; or
2. An offering of securities made outside the United States to
persons who are not residents of the United States where steps are
taken to prevent such securities flowing back into the United States.
'2
The Report of the Task Force has had little effect on Commission
positions on integration, and the five factor test remains its primary criteria
in responding to integration questions. The only direct response to the Task
Force Report was the resumption of publishing no action letters on integra-
tion questions.'
3
B. Limited Partnership Offerings
Traditional integration tests for corporate issuers generally have been
applied to limited partnership offerings. However, both the SEC and the
Bar have recognized that there are determinants of integration peculiar to
the limited partnership. An early recognition of this difference is noted in
the SEC staff's response in National Association of Home Builders.'4 The
staff stated that separate offerings to limited groups would not be integrated
solely because of the presence of a common general pattern if the projects
were financed by separate mortgages on separate sites or, if successive
12. See id. at 631-41 (recommending new safe harbors from application of integration).
13. See 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 403 (1985) (SEC staff announcing at symposium
held in March 1985 that staff would resume issuing no-action letters on integration questions).
14. (avail. Mar. 23, 1972) (SEC no-action letter).
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portions of a project were involved, the portions were financially independ-
ent.
This separateness test also has been used in oil and gas offerings; projects
are not integrated when drilling is on geographically separate projects or
acreage, the purchase of an interest in one partnership would not entitle the
purchaser to any right or interest in the prior project, and offers in one
partnership would not start until drilling had commenced on the prior
project. 5
Subsequently in 1982, in response to what it perceived to be confused
and conflicting precedent, the ABA Subcommittee on Partnerships, Trusts
and Unincorporated Associations issued a position paper entitled "Integra-
tion of Partnership Offerings: A Proposal for Identifying a Discrete Offer-
ing."' 6 The Subcommittee proposed a safe harbor for limited partnership
offerings if all of the following conditions are met:
1. Separate Entity: The partnership shall be a separate legal
entity with separate books and records, and funds received by or
contributed to the partnership shall not be commingled with funds
of a common sponsor or any other entity with a common sponsor.
2. Economic Independence: The partnership shall, at the time
interests therein are offered and sold, have an independent oppor-
tunity to meet its primary investment objectives, i.e., the economic
results of its investments shall not be substantially dependent upon
the creation, continued existence or economic results of the invest-
ments of another entity previously, simultaneously or subsequently
formed with a common sponsor.
3. Application of Proceeds: [N]o material portion of the gross
offering proceeds of the partnership shall be invested in properties
in which another entity with a common sponsor shall invest, or shall
have invested (and continue to hold invested), a material portion of
its gross offering proceeds. 17
If the assets in which the partnership intends to invest at least fifty
percent of its gross offering proceeds (as its principal business or businesses)
are not specifically identified to offerees, then: (i) each other entity with a
common sponsor previously formed to conduct the same general types of
activities shall have invested or committed for investment the major portion
of its gross offering proceeds before the commencement of the offering of
the partnership interests; and (ii) no simultaneous or subsequent offering of
interests in another entity with a common sponsor organized for the same
general types of activities shall be commenced before the partnership has
15. Martin Exploration Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,794 (Sept. 7, 1976); Churchill and Hoskins (avail. Oct. 25, 1978)
(SEC NO-ACTION LETTER).
16. 37 Bus. LAW. 1591 (1982).
17. Id. at 1611.
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invested or committed for investment the major portion of its gross offering
proceeds, unless the assets in which such other entity intends to invest at
least fifty percent of its gross offering proceeds are identified specifically to
its offerees.'
8
C. Single Issuer Versus Different Issuers
Integration fact patterns may be divided into issuer integration and
offering integration. The first category, and the most straightforward, in-
volves integration of multiple and often contemporaneous offerings by the
same issuer. A typical example would involve several contemporaneous
offerings by the same issuer. In these cases, the staff in no action letters has
used the traditional five tests, and particularly the general purpose test, to
determine whether the offerings should be integrated.' 9 These offerings, given
the identity of the issuer, are more susceptible to application of the traditional
five tests. Even in these situations, however, the SEC staff has not differ-
entiated the relative weight to be given the different tests. Thus the staff has
declined to integrate offerings that were not for the same general purpose
even when the other tests were met.20 Similarly the staff has held the
integration doctrine to be inapplicable on facts that on their face would seem
to fall within the integration tests. Thus in the case of issuers of high grade
commercial paper, the staff has declined to integrate the commercial paper
offered under the section 3(a)(3) exemption with promissory notes offered
under the section 4(2) exemption."
Offerings by different but related issuers involve distinctly different
questions from multiple offerings by the same issuer. Most of these offerings
arise in the context of the limited partnership. The differences in the
applicability of the integration doctrine to single and multiple issuers stems
from structural differences in the single issuer limited partnership offering
and multiple issuer offerings. The corporate issuer customarily is formed to
conduct one or more businesses over a period of time. The limited partner-
ship, on the other hand, customarily is formed for a specific project or
purpose, generally has no operating history, and has a finite and limited life.
Management of the limited partnership is often separate from management
of the project and often performs its duties on a part time basis. In these
circumstances traditional tests of integration have tended to be irrelevant.
For example, consider the applicability of the five factors to simultaneous
offerings of limited partnership interests by separate limited partnerships
with a common general partner. Under the five factors the two offerings
18. Id.
19. Delorean Motor Co. (avail. Sept. 15, 1977) (SEC no-action letter).
20. Wellington Fund, Inc. (avail. Sept. 22, 1976) (SEC no-action letter).
21. See Report of ABA Task Force on Integration, supra note 11, at 619-20 (citing e.g.,
First & Merchant Corp. (avail. July 27, 1978) (SEC no-action letter); Pittsburg Nat'l Corp.
(avail. Aug. 15, 1977) (SEC no-action letter); Alabama Bancorporation (avail. July 8, 1977)
(SEC no-action letter); Security Pac. Corp. (avail. Oct. 14, 1976) (SEC no-action letter)).
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would be considered integrated since they were made (i) at the same time,
(ii) for the same consideration (cash), (iii) for the same general purpose and (iv)
as part of a single plan of financing (to benefit the sponsor). Whether the
offerings involve the issuance of the same class of securities would appear
to depend on whether the limited partnership interests had similar rights and
claims on assets.
Perhaps because of the difficulty in applying the traditional tests to
limited partnership offerings, the SEC staff has tended to give weight to
those factors tending to support economic dependence of the separate limited
partnerships. Applying these criteria, it has been easier for the staff to find
separate projects, and therefore discrete transactions, if real estate, horses,
or shopping center booths rather than oil and gas properties were involved.
22
D. Underlying Rationale
The rationale for integration must at bottom be a concern that the
disclosure obligations not be circumvented by separating a unitary offering
into its component parts. Without disclosure concerns there would appear
little need for invoking the doctrine. Disclosure traditionally has been asso-
ciated with offerings of securities. If the offering was subject to registration,
the mandatory disclosure requirements would be activated and any prescribed
disclosures would be made in the statutory registration statement with respect
to the issuer's business and its management. In recent years two significant
developments have occurred that have reduced the importance of offering-
oriented disclosure: selective or differential disclosure, and ongoing post-
offering disclosure. Differential disclosure has resulted in differing degrees
of disclosure depending on the quality and seasoning of the issuer and the
amount and type of securities offered. 23 Ongoing disclosure requirements
broadly attach to all companies in which there is a significant public interest.
In a related development, the Commission has required in Regulation D of
the Securities Act of 1933 that the offering documents contain disclosure
modeled on the several registration forms.24 These developments on the one
hand have reduced the importance of the statutory prospectus as the unique
basis of disclosure and, on the other hand, have emphasized that the type
and extent of disclosure varies depending on such factors as the quality of
the issuer and the type of offering.
At the same time as the Commission has departed from unitary disclo-
sure, there has been a heightened concern with anti-fraud disclosure. To the
extent that disclosure has become more differentiated and pervasive, anti-
fraud disclosure has tended to receive greater emphasis by the courts. The
22. See Integration of Partnership Offerings: A Proposal for Identifying a Discrete
Offering, supra note 16, at 1605-06.
23. For example, Forms S-I, S-2 and S-3 tailor the requisite disclosure to the quality of
the issuer and the length of time it has been subject to the filing requirements. Form S-16 is
for oil and gas offerings, and Form S-I is for real estate offerings.
24. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (1986).
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recent holding in SEC v. Murphy25 illustrates this point. In Murphy, interests
in approximately thirty separate limited partnerships with different general
partners were sold to purchase cable television systems formed by the
promoter. 26 The limited partnerships were separate legal entities and in most
instances the general partners were not related to the promoter, Murphy.
27
Approximately $7.5 million was raised from more than 400 investors over a
two-year period. 28 Murphy was enjoined from violating the registration and
anti-fraud provisions of the Federal securities laws. 29 The court held that
because the purpose of the registration provisions was to protect investors
and because financial information about the promoter was material to the
investment decision, the promoter was considered the issuer of the partner-
ship interests for purposes of determining the availability of the private
offering exemption.3 0 When the offerings were integrated, the private offering
exemption was destroyed. The court stated:
[W]e note that our holding today does not mean that anyone
who has information material to an investment decision is trans-
formed into an issuer. We hold only that when a person organizes
or sponsors the organization of limited partnerships and is primarily
responsible for the success or failure of the venture for which the
partnership is formed, he will be considered an issuer for purposes
of determining the availability of the private offering exemption.,
Murphy involved clear anti-fraud violations, including commingling of part-
nership funds. The interrelation of the integration and the anti-fraud issues
is not considered in the opinion. It is not by accident, however, that Murphy
and other cases32 which sweepingly expand the integration doctrine arise in an
anti-fraud context.
E. Observations
The broad generic tests of integration that arose in the early years of
the Federal securities acts are no longer adequate for present day integration
concerns. They have not proven adequate for the traditional corporate
offering and are certainly not responsive to the unique structural character-
istics of the limited partnership. The increasingly sophisticated and far
reaching disclosure scheme has rendered these tests inadequate if not obsolete.
As the disclosure in a Regulation D private placement memorandum more
25. 626 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1980).
26. Id. at 637.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 659.
30. Id. at 643-44.
31. Id. at 644 (footnote omitted).
32. See SEC v. Holschuh, 694 F.2d 130 (7th Cir. 1982) (involving sham operation in
which money raised by partnership was siphoned off by defendant and his business associates
for their own uses).
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closely approaches prospectus disclosure, the need for integration would
appear to turn on different determinants. We submit that there should be
separate determinants for integration of the limited partnership in view of
its unique structural characteristics and the determinants should be responsive
to limited partnerships' characteristics. Tests that are directed to the economic
realities of limited partnerships, 33 rather than the traditional purpose-oriented
tests, are consistent with this objective. The tests suggested by the ABA
Subcommittee on Partnerships, Trusts and Unincorporated Association 34
represent a realistic response to these concerns.
III. ALL OR NONE OFFRINMGS UNDER RULE lOb-9"1
Rule lOb-9 and its companion rule 15c2-4 were adopted to prohibit
offerings from being made on an "all or none" basis or some other
contingency unless all securities required to meet the contingency were in
fact sold before the offering's designated termination date. In recent years,
a partly unwritten body of interpretation developed regarding what consti-
tutes a "bona fide" purchase of securities for purposes of rules lOb-9 and
15c2-4, what advance disclosure may be required regarding purchases by
general partners or broker-dealers, and even what constitutes an all or none
offering. In two recent interpretive letters,36 the SEC staff not only provided
more specific interpretations, but in effect promulgated what are highly
specific regulations for certain selling practices.
A. History-Rule 10b-9 and Rule 15c2-4
Most partnership offerings, such as real estate and oil and gas offerings,
need a certain minimum level of subscriptions to undertake operations (to
purchase the property or to purchase prospects and drill wells), and, conse-
quently, normally are made on an all-or-none or part-or-none ("minimum-
maximum") basis. In an all-or-none offering, all of the securities must be
sold within the specified offering period or, if that condition is not met, all
subscriptions must be returned to the investors. In a part-or-none, or
minimum-maximum offering, a designated minimum amount of the securities
must be sold within a specified time, or the issuer must return all subscriptions
to investors. If the minimum number of securities is sold within the desig-
nated period, the subscriptions received may be accepted, the issuer usually
33. For example, whether projects are covered by a common mortgage, the sharing of
project amenities, the interdependence of operating results, cross-collateralization of mortgages,
and common or generic advertising and sales efforts for one or more projects.
34. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (discussing tests suggested by ABA
Subcommittee on Partnerships, Trusts and Unincorporated Associations).
35. This section expands on and updates this subject, which was previously addressed in
two articles by Mr. Robbins. See Robbins, All-or-None Offerings, 19 REV. SEc. REG. 59 (1986);
Robbins, All-or-None Offerings: An Update, 19 REV. SEC. REG. 180 (1986).
36. See Timothy M. Homer, Esq. (Oct. 16, 1985) (SEC interpretive letter); American Bar
Association (Apr. 29, 1986) (SEC interpretive letter).
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will commence operations, and the issuer may continue selling for the
duration of the offering period.1
7
The natural pressures to close offerings led some issuers in the early
days of partnership offerings to construct offerings that, although apparently
all-or-none or part-or-none, in fact could be closed without sales of all the
securities if commitments, or indications of interest, for all the securities had
been obtained. This frequently meant that the issuers were ultimately capi-
talized with far less than the anticipated proceeds of the offering. The SEC
responded in 1962 with the adoption of rules 15c2-4 and lOb-9.
Rule 15c2-4 makes it a "fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or
practice" for purposes of section 15(c)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the '34 Act) for a broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer to
participate in an offering made on an "all or none" basis or on the basis of
some other contingency, unless all funds received from investors are trans-
mitted promptly 8 to a bank that has agreed in writing to hold all such funds
in escrow until the designated contingency has either been fulfilled or has
failed. 39 Rule lOb-9, adopted under section 10(b) of the '34 Act, specifies
37. A variant is the "step" offering, in which the issuer may accept subscriptions only at
the minimum and in designated "steps" up to the maximum offering. This may be used, for
instance, for a partnership that will purchase expensive equipment such as drilling rigs, and
which requires a designated increment of subscriptions to purchase each additional piece of
equipment. See Falcon 80-2/Tierra 80-2, SEC Reg. No. 2-68966 (1980).
38. The practical application of the "prompt transmittal" provision of Rule 15c2-4 was
subject to a number of questions, which were generally resolved in the SEC staff's interpretive
letter to Linda A. Wertheimer, Chairman, Subcommittee on Partnerships, Trusts and Unincor-
porated Associations, Federal Regulation of Securities Committee, American Bar Association.
See Linda A. Wertheimer (Oct. 16, 1984) (SEC interpretive letter); NASD Notice to Members
84-64 (November 26, 1984). See also Bergmann, Contingency Offerings: Escrow Accounts and
Related Issues, Broker-Dealer Compliance-A Compliance Conference for the Financial Services
Industry (September 27, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Contingency Offerings]; Bergmann, Some
Compliance Considerations in Underwritings, Critical Current Legislative and Regulatory Issues
Affecting Publicly Traded and Private Limited Partnerships (ABA Section of Corporation,
Banking and Business Law, 1986 Annual Meeting) (July 15, 1986) [hereinafter cited as
Compliance Considerations in Underwritings].
39. Rule 15c2-4 provides in full as follows:
It shall constitute a "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act or practice" as
used in section 15(c)(2) of the Act, for any broker, dealer or municipal securities
dealer participating in any distribution of securities, other than a firm commitment
underwriting, to accept any part of the sale price of any security being distributed
unless:
(a) The money or other consideration received is promptly transmitted to
the persons entitled thereto; or
(b) If the distribution is being made on an "all-or-none" basis, or on any
other basis which contemplates that payment is not to be made to the
person on whose behalf the distribution is being made until some
further event or contingency occurs, (1) the money or other consider-
ation received is promptly deposited in a separate bank account, as
agent or trustee for the persons who have the beneficial interests
therein, until the appropriate event or contingency has occurred, and
then the funds are promptly transmitted or returned to the persons
[Vol. 43:829
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that it is a "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" to represent:
(1) that a security is being sold on an all-or-none basis, unless the security
is part of an offering made on the condition that all or a specified amount
of the consideration paid will be returned to the purchasers unless (A) all of
the securities are sold at a specified price within a specified time and (B) the
seller receives the total amount due him by a specified date; or
(2) that a security is being sold on the basis of a contingency that a certain
amount be sold, unless it is part of an offering made on the condition that
all or a specified amount of the consideration paid will be returned to the
purchasers unless (A) a specified number of units of the security are sold at
a specified price within a specified time and (B) the total amount due to the
seller is received by him by a specified date."'
The two rules are intended to ensure that when securities are offered
pursuant to an all-or-none or designated minimum condition, investors'
funds will not be at risk until the designated amount of proceeds actually
entitled thereto, or (2) all such funds are promptly transmitted to a
bank which has agreed in writing to hold all such funds in escrow for
the persons who have the beneficial interests therein and to transmit
or return such funds directly to the persons entitled thereto when the
appropriate event or contingency has occurred.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-4 (1986).
40. Rule lOb-9 provides in full as follows:
(a) It shall constitute a "manipulative or deception [sic] device or contrivance,"
as used in section 10(b) of the Act, for any person, directly or indirectly, in connection
with the offer or sale of any security, to make any representation:
(1) to the effect that the security is being offered or sold on an "all-or-
none" basis, unless the security is part of an offering or distribution
being made on the condition that all or a specified amount of the
consideration paid for such security will be promptly refunded to the
purchaser unless (i) all of the securities being offered are sold at a
specified price within a specified time, and (ii) the total amount due
to the seller is received by him by a specified date; or
(2) to the effect that the security is being offered or sold on any other
basis whereby all or part of the consideration paid for any such
security will be refunded to the purchaser if all or some of the securities
are not sold, unless the security is part of an offering or distribution
being made on the condition that all or a specified part of the
consideration paid for such security will be promptly refunded to the
purchaser unless (i) a specified number of units of the security are
sold at a specified price within a specified time, and (ii) the total
amount due to the seller is received by him by a specified date.
(b) This rule shall not apply to any offer or sale of securities as to which the
seller has a firm commitment from underwriters or others (subject only to customary
conditions precedent, including "market outs") for the purchase of all the securities
being offered.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-9 (1986).
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has been received in cash in the escrow account, and that investors' funds
will be returned promptly if the designated amount has not been received by
the offering's stated termination date. The SEC summarized rule lOb-9's
purpose in the proposing release:
It is the purpose of the proposed rule to prohibit any person
from making any representations to the effect that the security is
being offered on an "all-or-none" basis unless it is clear that the
amount due to the purchaser is to be refunded to him unless all of
the securities being offered are sold and the seller receives the total
amount due to him in connection with the distribution.
4'
In the principal (and only substantial) interpretive release regarding rules
lOb-9 and 15c2-4, 42 the Commission indicated that the rule was primarily a
disclosure rule, designed to prevent the designation "all or one" from being
used unless the terms of the offering require actual receipt of the full amount
sought:
[O]ne of the primary purposes of the rule was to prohibit the
designation "all or none" or "part or none" from being utilized
where the underwriter is required only to get persons to agree to
purchase the specified minimum securities within the specified period
and is not required to collect full payment for such sales within the
specified period.
43
Thus, the release states, an offering may not be considered sold unless "all
the securities required to be placed are sold in bona fide transactions and
are fully paid for."" The release goes on to indicate that "non-bona fide
sales" are sales "designed to create the appearance of a successful completion
41. Exchange Act Release No. 6864, [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
76,855 (July 30, 1962). See also Exchange Act Release No. 6905 [1961-1964 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 76,869 (Oct. 3, 1962) (adopting Rule lOb-9). The release adopting
rule 15c2-4 described the Commission's concern as follows:
Sometimes the issuer on whose behalf a distribution is being made is a comparatively
new company, is making the public offering to raise the capital necessary to begin or
expand its activities, and the failure to receive it will substantially impair its ability
to continue in business or to conduct necessary operations. In some cases the "sale"
becomes final only if all the securities are sold within a specified period of time; and
the arrangement contemplates that the payments made by customers will be returned
to them if the distribution is not completed in the required time. The failure of the
underwriter or a participating broker-dealer to transmit the funds, or to maintain
them so that they will be insulated from and not be jeopardized by his unlawful
activities or financial reverses, could involve a fraud either upon the person on whose
behalf the distribution is being made or upon the customer to whom the payment is
to be returned if the distribution is not completed.
Exchange Act Release No. 6737 [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 76,825
(February 21, 1962).





of the offering, such as purchases by the issuer through nominee accounts
or purchases by persons whom the issuer has agreed to guarantee against
loss.'' 4
The history of rule lOb-9 supports the proposition that it is a disclosure
rule, intended to prevent misuse of the phrases "all-or-none" or "part-or-
none." Lawyers practicing in the area generally have assumed that an offering
would not offend rule lOb-9, regardless of its structure, if the terms of the
offering were fully, fairly and prominently disclosed. The SEC's Division of
Market Regulation, however, in recent years has developed a number of
unpublished interpretations regarding various issues that frequently arise,
and which in some cases have conflicted with custom and practice. While
the Division will not make available its internal telephone advice memoranda,
certain interpretations were included in the few available interpretive releases
and letters and in a 1982 outline prepared by Douglas Scarff, then Director
of the Division.4 Additional information has been provided more recently
in two recent staff outlines, 47 and in two recent interpretive letters, Timothy
M. Homer, Esq.48 and American Bar Association.49 The result has been a
commendable increase in the availability of guidance, but certain difficult
substantive issues remain.
B. Application-Rule lOb-9 in Practice
1. Closings prior to minimum level of subscriptions;
As previously noted, the underlying purpose of rule lOb-9 was to prevent
offerings made on an all-or-none basis from closing if the contingencies
described in the offering were not met. The core decisions applying the rule
all involve situations in which an issuer and broker-dealer acted to create the
false appearance of an offering's successful completion, usually by arranging
for orders by purchasers who either had no intention of paying or were
guaranteed against any investment risk.
In SEC v. Manor Nursing Center,50 for example, the issuer and selling
shareholders in a public all-or-none stock offering received the proceeds of
the offering even though, at the time of the closing, all of the purchasers'
checks had not cleared, and the number of shares purchased did not equal
the number offered. Certain of the selling shareholders then reinvested
offering proceeds to buy unsold shares, and creditors of the issuer were paid
45. Id.
46. Scarff, Developments in Trading Practices, I FOURTEENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
SECURITIES REU.ATION 435 (1982).
47. See Bergmann, Contingency Offerings, supra note 38; Bergmann, Compliance Con-
siderations in Underwriting, supra note 38.
48. Timothy M. Homer, Esq. (Oct. 16, 1985) (SEC interpretive letter).
49. American Bar Association (April 29, 1986) (SEC interpretive letter).
50. 340 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), modified, 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
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in stock "in an effort to make it appear that the issue had been sold." ' ,
After the closing, checks for over half the proceeds bounced, having been
submitted with no expectation of payment by persons who had been solicited
by two of the selling shareholders to create the appearance of bona fide
sales.12 The checks delivered by the underwriter to the selling shareholders
in turn bounced, whereupon the issuer paid out to the selling shareholders
the proceeds that the issuer had received. 53 The court described the subscrip-
tions by persons who had no intention of buying shares as "a'bootstrap
operation' to give the underwriting a facade of completeness." 54 While the
court failed to mention that this "monstrous fraud" violated Rule lOb-9 as
well as rule 15c2-4 and a host of other provisions, it may have been avoiding
excessive detail.
In the context of the Manor Nursing Center case and other cases of
clearly fraudulent closings, 55 not surprisingly courts began to describe broadly
the evils proscribed by rule lOb-9. In A. J. White & Co. v. SEC,56 for
example, a 1977 case involving a public part-or-none stock offering, the
issuer and underwriter achieved the minimum level of "sales" by arranging
loans for purchases in violation of sections 7(c) and I 1(d)(1) of the '34 Act. 7
In addition to guaranteeing persons for whom the issuer and underwriter
purchased shares that they would not have to put up any money, the issuer
and underwriter purchased shares using borrowed funds for persons who
were not even aware of the offering or who had indicated that they could
not pay for any purchases. 58 The First Circuit observed that the use of sales
financed by bank loans to purchasers who were guaranteed against loss was
a material and misleading change in the method of distribution:
The knowledge that the minimum amount has been sold to bona
fide investors may be a very important matter to the other investors.
Particularly in cases such as this, an offering of shares in a new
company, one of the investors' major concerns will be whether the
price they are paying for the securities is a fair market price. The
inability of the underwriter to sell the specified minimum to bona
fide investors may well indicate that the market judges the offering
price to be too high. Thus, to declare an offering completed through
non-bona fide sales financed through bank loans, where the pur-
ported investors have not made an investment decision backed with
51. Id. at 918.
52. Id. at 918-19.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 924.
55. See, e.g., SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950
(1979); FAI Investment Analysts, Inc., 46 S.E.C. 1134 (1977); Roald George Gregersen, 46
S.E.C. 387 (1976).
56. 556 F.2d 619 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977).
57. Id. at 623-24.
58. Id. at 621.
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their own money, may significantly mislead the legitimate investors
as to a crucial factor in their decision.59
The Commission opinion under review also had emphasized the loans and
guarantees against loss, 60 but it was the First Circuit's "fair market price"
language that the court repeated in SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc.
6
1
five years later. In Blinder, Robinson, the issuer and underwriter of an all-
or-none stock offering committed some of the proceeds in advance of the
closing to obtain a bank loan to purchase additional shares and obtained
funds from the escrow account before the closing of the offering. 62 The
underwriter then engaged in substantial trading activity in the stock, all
without an actual closing of the offering. 63 The district court, citing A. J.
White, stated in dictum that in an all-or-none stock offering by a new
company the investors are entitled to assume that the offering will succeed
only if their investment judgment, in effect, is corroborated by sufficient
other investors to fully subscribe the offering:
[I]n an "all or none" offering of securities by a new company,
whether all the securities have been sold to the public in bona fide
transactions is of particular importance because the "all or none"
contingency is the investors' principal protection. Each investor is
comforted by the knowledge that unless his judgment to take the
risk is shared by enough others to sell out the issue, his money will
be returned. 64
The "corroboration" theory (advanced to date only in the A. J. White
and Blinder, Robinson cases), with its concept of investor "comfort," gives
rule lOb-9 far more content than ever appeared in its adopting and interpre-
tive releases and could lead to the conclusion that even when purchasers
take the risk of the investment, their affiliation with the issuer (or other lack
of independent judgment) may give rise to a violation. For example, when
an underwriter makes purchases for discretionary accounts in an all-or-none
59. Id. at 623 (emphasis added).
60. See A. J. White & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 12614 (July 9, 1976). In A.J.
While & Co., the Commission noted that
[t]hese arrangements, which in essence constituted 100% financings, relieved the
ultimate purchasers from the commitments and the obligations that a purchaser of
securities normally incurs. Since the loans were quite convenient, and were considered
windfalls to a number of purchasers, the purchasers did not have to make investment
determinations based solely upon the investment risks and merits of the securities.
Under the circumstances, the purchasers seemed to have little concern regarding
personal obligations under the loans, especially in view of registrant's representations
that losses would be most unlikely.
Id.
61. 542 F. Supp. 468 (D. Colo. 1982), aff'd, 748 F.2d 1415 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 783 (1985).
62. Id. at 479.
63. Id. at 478.
64. Id. at 476.
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offering, has the underwriter deprived other investors of their expectation
that unaffiliated investors exercising their independent judgment would be
purchasing all of the offered securities? 65 In a private offering of real estate
limited partnership interests, would substantial purchases by the seller of the
real estate "mislead" investors? Is the answer different if the officers of the
sponsor who make the purchases have the right to purchase units net of
commissions?6
The Blinder, Robinson "comfort" language, extending far beyond the
stated purposes of rule lOb-9, should not be the basis for expanding rule
lOb-9 from a "full disclosure" rule to a vague guarantee of investor
assurance. Nevertheless, some reliance on the Blinder, Robinson reasoning
has developed recently. 67 Given the vagueness of the "corroboration" or
"comfort" standard, practitioners recently have had increasing difficulty
defining the circumstances in which rule lOb-9 applies. The difficulties are
greatest in the case of purchases or undertakings to purchase by affiliates
of the issuer.
2. Purchases by the General Partner or Affiliates
a. Discretionary Purchases of Unsold Units.
The "corroboration" concept assumes that sales will be made to unaf-
filiated third parties exercising independent investment judgment. Many
instances exist, however, in which the sponsor or affiliates may purchase
unsold interests in an all-or-none offering.6t In the case of private offerings
65. See Rooney, Pace, Inc., Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-6332 (May 24, 1985),
at n.24 (initial decision) (citing SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 468 (D.
Colo. 1982), aff'd, 748 F.2d 1415 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 783 (1985)). In
Rooney, Pace, Inc., Administrative Law Judge Regensteiner in his initial decision raised, but
did not decide, the question whether an underwriter, by purchasing for discretionary accounts
in all-or-none offerings, deprives other investors of their expectations that unaffiliated investors
exercising independent judgment would be purchasing all of the offered securities. Id.
66. See infra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing purchases net of commissions).
67. See Timothy M. Homer, Esq. (Oct. 16, 1985) (SEC interpretive letter). The staff
indicated in Timothy M. Homer, Esq., a recent interpretive letter under Rule lOb-9, that
satisfaction of the "Specified Sales Level" in an all-or-none or part-or-none offering "indicates
that the offering was priced fairly." Id. See infra notes 67-84 and accompanying text (discussing
Homer interpretive letter). See also Bergmann, Contingency Offerings, supra note 38.
68. Naturally, such purchases may not be made by the issuer itself, when the effect would
be to reduce the capital anticipated to be available to the issuer at the completion of the
offering. Exchange Act Release No. 11532, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 22,730 (July 11, 1975).
In the situation generally presented, however, purchases by affiliates of the issuer would not
affect the financial condition of the issuer.
Certain disclosure requirements also will apply whenever a possibility exists that an affiliate
may purchase a substantial amount of securities. At a minimum, the offering document should
describe the risk that such purchases may make it more difficult for unaffiliated investors to
exercise whatever voting rights are provided by the documents, and also should indicate that
such purchases may create an additional conflict of interest between the sponsor and unaffiliated
investors, since the sponsor may have an interest in recovering its investment earlier than




of partnership interests under Regulation D, the staff has approved such
purchases by the general partner of the partnership making the offering
when
(i) the issuer has disclosed the possibility that the general partner
may purchase limited partnership interests in order to meet the
specified minimum;
(ii) the maximum amount of the possible purchases is disclosed; and
(iii) the purchases are made for investment rather than resale. 69
The portion of the release cited above (Question 79) applied by its terms
to private offerings only, and at least the requirement that purchases be
made "for investment" could be read as limited to the private offering
context. 0 The staff recently indicated, however, that it considers the position
taken in Question 79 to be fully applicable to public offerings, 7' and the
staff has confirmed in discussions that it believes specifically that purchases
by the general partner or affiliates must be made for investment even in a
public offering.
This position, which appears to blur together the concepts of "purchasing
for investment" and "taking the risk of investment," has not been articulated
in a published release or interpretive letter. The relevant question appears to
be not whether a purchase is made "for investment," since in a public
offering no such requirement is imposed on any purchaser, but whether the
purchase is "bona fide" for purposes of rule lOb-9. Neither existing releases nor
case law have taken the position that a sale must be "for investment" to be
bona fide; the purchaser must simply be purchasing the securities on the
same terms as other investors, for the same consideration, and without any
guarantees against loss. He must, under the case law, take the risk of the
investment.7 2 It remains unclear, however, to what extent the staff may
consider purchases for resale by the sponsor or affiliates in a public offering
to be inconsistent with rule lOb-9.
69. Securities Act Release No. 6455, Fed. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 2380, at Question 79
(March 3, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Release No. 6455].
70. See Item 18(D) of Securities Act Industry Guide 5, FED. SaC. L. REP. (CCH) 3829,
at 3347 (May 4, 1983). Item 18(D) of Securities Act Industry Guide 5 specifically contemplates
resales, in a public offering, of securities purchased by the general partner or affiliates to meet
the minimum in a real estate offering:
If the General Partner or its affiliates intend to purchase interests, and such interests
will be included in satisfying the minimum offering requirements, it should be disclosed
whether such interests are intended to be resold, and if so, the period of time these
interests will be held prior to being resold. Depending on the circumstances, such
interests may be considered to be unsold allotments under Section 4(3) of the Act.
(See Securities Act Release 4150.)
Id.
71. See Bergmann, Contingency Offerings, supra note 38.
72. See A. J. White & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 12614 (July 9, 1976); supra note
60 (quoting A. J. White & Co.).
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b. Undertakings to Make Loans or Purchase Units
It is often desirable in a private placement, particularly when the sale of
all the securities is necessary to accomplish the offering's objectives, for the
sponsor to undertake the purchase of unsold units. The sponsor may
undertake that it will purchase unsold units at the close of the offering, or
during the offering, after the sale of a designated minimum, in an effort to
provide assurance that the offering will close and to permit early admission
of some investors. Under rule 10b-9, however, a commitment to purchase
interests is not a bona fide purchase, and in the normal case such a
commitment will not itself provide the basis for closing an all-or-none
offering.
73
It is equally clear that a general partner may undertake to purchase any
units that remain unsold on termination of the offering, when the closing
takes place at the offering's termination on the basis of actual purchases by
the general partner rather than only a commitment. 74 Questions arise when
the general partner desires an interim closing based on assurances that the
offering will be fully sold.
As recently as 1982, the staff took a no-action position under Rule lOb-
9 to permit the general partner of a limited partnership to loan funds to the
partnership to meet the designated minimum level of subscriptions for an
interim closing, on the conditions (i) that the possibility of the loan and the
maximum amount of the loan, if made, are disclosed and (ii) that by the
offering's terms, the general partner must make an irrevocable commitment,
disclosed in the offering document, to purchase for investment any securities
not sold to investors at the offering's expiration date. 7 This position was
workable and was based soundly on the disclosure principles of Rule lOb-9.
A more restrictive position was taken, however, in a 1985 seminar outline
prepared by a staff member, 76 and then in a staff interpretive letter, Timothy
M. Homer, Esq. 
7
73. FAI Investment Analysts, Inc., 46 S.E.C. 1134, 1136 (1977).
74. Roger C. Hartman, Esq. (Urban Improvement Fund Ltd.-1975), SEC Interpretive
Letter [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,396 (Oct. 3, 1975) [hereinafter
cited as Urban Improvement Fund Ltd.-1975]. The staff indicated that since no funds would
be returned to investors regardless of the number of units sold, based on the general partner's
undertaking to purchase all unsold units, rule lOb-9 would not even be applicable. In the
American Bar Association interpretive letter discussed below, the staff reiterated this position,
but imposed certain requirements on the General Partner. See infra notes 87-92 and accompa-
nying text (discussing American Bar Association interpretive letter).
75. See Scarff, Developments in Trading Practices, supra note 46, at 473. Although the
outline stated that the staff had taken a "no-action" position, the position was never set out
in a no action or interpretive letter. It is rarely if ever appropriate for the broker-dealer to loan
funds to the issuer, since such loans would violate section 1 l(d)(l) of the Exchange Act and
applicable margin regulations.
76. Bergmann, Contingency Offerings, supra note 38, at § 1.4.d:
On occasion, the staff has been asked whether an irrevocable commitment by the
general partner or an affiliate to purchase any securities that are unsold at the
offering's termination date will satisfy the offering's contingency that some or all of
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c. The Horner Interpretive Letter.
In Timothy M. Homer, Esq., the issuer offered two alternative offering
structures for consideration. The Homer issuer first proposed to conduct its
offering precisely in the manner described in the staff's 1982 position (Horner
proposal 1): if minimum subscriptions had not been received by a specified
date, the sponsor would provide a loan to the partnership in an amount
equal to the aggregate sales price of all unsold units, and an interim closing
would then be held at which subscriptions then in escrow would be released.
The sponsor would continue to offer the securities and its loan would be
repayable out of the proceeds from the sales. At the offering's termination,
if any securities remained unsold, the sponsor's loan would be repaid by
issuance of the unsold securities, which would be held by the sponsor for
investment.
The staff concluded that Homer proposal 1 failed to satisfy the require-
ment of rule lOb-9 that "an offering may not be considered 'sold' for
purposes of the representation 'all or none' unless all the securities re-
quired to be placed are sold in bona fide transactions and are fully paid
for."78 The staff articulated the position described above, 79 that "a bona
fide transaction is one in which the investor purchases with investment intent
(i.e., not with a view to immediate resale)," 80 then indicated that the Homer
proposal 1 was unacceptable because it (i) would allow a closing before all
of the securities had been sold and (ii) would allow a closing based on a
commitment to purchase rather than an actual purchase.
The staff's first basis, that the offering would allow a closing before all
of the securities had been sold, took a relatively inflexible approach to
disclosure and rule lOb-9. Certainly the Homer proposal 1 envisioned a
the securities be sold by a specified date. Usually, the general partner states that the
purpose for the commitment is to allow tax or other benefits to accrue to the investors
who would become limited partners after an interim closing is held. The staff,
however, has declined to grant no-action relief under these circumstances since the
contingencies of the offering have not been satisfied. Release 34-11532 supra makes
it clear that commitments to purchase are not bona fide sales for purposes of Rule
lOb-9. Investors may become subject to the risks and/or benefits of the partnership
only after a closing of the offering and breaking of escrow based upon complete
satisfaction of all contingencies.
An additional suggestion has been made that the general partner's commitment to
purchase would be backed by a letter of credit. However, the staff does not believe
that a letter of credit satisfies the requirements that the securities be fully paid for
prior to closing.
77. Timothy M. Homer, Esq. (Oct. 16, 1985) (SEC interpretive letter).
78. Id.
79. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text (discussing requirement that purchase
be made with investment intent).
80. One might assume that this statement should be limited to the private offering context
in which it was made, since the sponsor otherwise would have the burden of establishing to its
own satisfaction that all purchases in a public all-or-none or part-or-none offering are being
made with investment intent. But see supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text (discussing
applicability to public offerings).
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closing before all of the securities had been sold, but it also provided for
complete disclosure of the arrangement and the possibility that an interim
closing could occur based on a sponsor loan. The staff's 1982 position
approving such an arrangement on the basis of full disclosure seems more
soundly based on the disclosure policies of rule lOb-9.
The staff's second basis for rejecting Homer proposal 1 was that the
arrangement would permit a closing based on a commitment to purchase
"rather than purchases with investment intent accompanied by full contem-
poraneous payment for those purchases." 8' In Homer proposal 1, however,
all of the sponsor's funds would be advanced at the time of the interim
closing in the form of a loan. The only transaction that the general partner
promised was the conversion of the loan into an investment in partnership
interests at the termination of the offering, which presumably could have
occurred automatically by the terms of the loan documents without any
affirmative action by the sponsor.
In Homer, the staff approved of an alternative arrangement (Homer
proposal 2) under which the same offering would be conducted on a part
or none, or minimum-maximum, basis. Investor funds would be held in
escrow until the sponsor had sold the minimum level of subscriptions, at
which time an interim closing could be held, and the sponsor would loan to
the partnership the full purchase price of the unsold securities. The proceeds
from subsequent sales would be used to repay the sponsor's loan, and at
termination of the offering, the sponsor would either accept repayment of
the loan in unsold securities or leave the loan in place.
The principal differences between the two proposals were that in Homer
proposal 1 (a) there was no designated minimum that had to be achieved
based on actual sales before the interim closing, 82 and (b) the general partner
made a commitment to purchase unsold interests, rather than leaving open
the possibility that not all of the securities would be sold. Which difference
was determinative in the staff's view? Could a designated minimum level of
subscriptions for the interim closing be combined with a commitment by the
general partner to convert its loan into unsold units at the termination of
the offering?83 In telephone advice, the staff stated that it could not-such
81. Timothy M. Homer, Esq. (Oct. 16, 1985) (SEC staff interpretive letter).
82. See Urban Improvement Fund Ltd.-1975, supra note 74. Under Urban Improvement
Fund Ltd.-1975, the lack of a specified minimum should not in itself be determinative. Id.
When the general partner pledged to purchase all unsold units at the closing, regardless of the
amount sold, the staff concluded that the offering was not even covered by rule lOb-9. Is
Homer proposal 1 that different? Although the general partner will make a loan rather than
purchase unsold units, the loan must be repaid in unsold units at the termination of the offering.
Further, it was established in Securities Act Release No. 6455 that the designated minimum
level of subscriptions need not be reached solely by sales to third parties. See Release No. 6455,
supra note 69, at Question 79; supra note 69 and accompanying text (quoting Release No.
6455). The sponsor may purchase securities to reach the minimum, provided there has been
adequate advance disclosure. Release No. 6455, supra note 69, at Question 79.
83. The Homer interpretive letter, in approving the second proposal, indicates only that
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a commitment by the general partner would convert the offering into an all-
or-none offering, instead of a part-or-none offering, and the interim closing
would then violate rule l0b-9."
The Homer approach attempted to divide offering structures cleanly into
"all-or-none" or "part-or-none," yet an intermediate approach along the
lines of Homer proposal 1 offers the greatest benefits to investors. Investors
benefit from an undertaking that if the offering is closed on an interim basis
with a specified minimum level of subscriptions and a loan from the general
partner covering the unsold interests, at termination of the offering the
general partner's loan will be converted into units. Since the funds have
already been provided to the partnership, no risk of default exists, and if
the general partner instead were to leave the loan in place, the accompanying
interest cost would burden the partnership's operating results. If the general
partner is not permitted to undertake to convert its loan to partnership
interests, the investors must accept the uncertainty of not knowing whether
such a loan by the general partner, of undetermined size, will remain in
place during the life of the partnership.85
Homer was criticized by practitioners on the ground that it prohibited
even fully disclosed offering structures that generally were accepted as fair
and reasonable. Additionally, Homer required that offerings be structured
in a manner that left investors uninformed about the general partner's
intention to purchase unsold units on termination of the offering.8
6
d. The American Bar Association Interpretive Letter
The Homer letter prompted action by a Task Force of the American
Bar Association Federal Regulation of Securities Committee, Subcommittee
on Partnerships, Trusts and Unincorporated Associations (Task Force),
which requested by letter dated April 16, 1986 that the staff reconsider
certain positions taken in the Homer letter. The Task Force indicated that
it was "concerned that the apparent positions expressed by the staff in [the
Homer letter] ... and in other contexts would prohibit certain offerings
which are common industry practice and which the Task Force believes are
in compliance with both rule lOb-9 and rule 15c2-4." 81
it is clear to investors that the syndication will achieve the Required Funding Level
[the maximum offering], but only the Specified Minimum is required to be sold to
investors who make full payment for their securities with investment intent prior to
the Specified Minimum Date.
Timothy M. Homer, Esq. (Oct. 16, 1985) (SEC interpretive letter).
84. Telephone advice from Kevin Corcoran, Staff Attorney, Division of Market Regula-
tion, Securities and Exchange Commission (October 1985).
85. Projections, where provided, would have to address at least the anticipated results
assuming (1) all the securities are sold, and (2) only the minimum level of sales is achieved, and
the general partner's loan for the remainder remains in effect for the life of the partnership.
86. See Robbins, All-or-None Offerings, supra note 35, at nn. 29-30.
87. Letter from Task Force of the American Bar Association Federal Regulation of
Securities Committee, Subcommittee on Partnerships, Trusts and Unincorporated Associations
to Securities and Exchange Commission Staff (Apr. 16, 1986).
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The Task Force proposed, and the staff agreed, that offerings which
comply with the following procedures will satisfy rules lOb-9 and 15c2-4:
A. "Part or none" Offerings
An offering shall not be deemed to be an "all or none" offering
for purposes of rule lOb-9(a)(1) and shall be in compliance with rules
lOb-9 and/or 15c2-4, provided that:
I. Where there is a specified minimum number of securities ("Spec-
ified Minimum") which must be sold by a specified date ("Spec-
ified Date"), investors' funds are held in escrow until the Specified
Minimum has been sold.
2. If the Specified Minimum is sold in bona fide transactions by the
Specified Date and such securities have been fully paid for with
customer funds that have cleared the banking system, the funds
re!ceived at the interim closing date for the offering ("Interim
Closing Date") may be distributed from escrow to the issuer and
the offering may continue, where the Sponsor agrees at the
commencement of the offering that if a specified maximum
number of securities ("Specified Maximum") has not been sold
and the purchase price for such securities is not received by a
specified offering termination date ("Termination Date"):
a. On such Termination Date, the Sponsor will purchase
for its own account the balance of the unsold securities
required for the partnership's business operations as
specified in the offering documents, and/or
b. On the Interim Closing Date and/or Termination Date,
the Sponsor will lend to the issuer all or that portion
of the difference between the Specified Minimum and
Specified Maximum required for the partnership's
business operations as specified in the offering docu-
ments.
c. In the case of an offering that is intended to comply
with either paragraph 2(a) or (b) above, all of the
following conditions must also be met:
a. Any such commitment of the Sponsor to purchase
securities or lend funds as described in the offering
documents is an unconditional obligation of the Spon-
sor;
b. The Sponsor can demonstrate at the time of com-
mencement of the offering and at the Interim Closing
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Date a present and continuing ability to satisfy its
commitment ("continuing ability" being deemed to
mean no known or reasonably foreseeable events that
would make it unable to satisfy its commitment);
c. The offering materials contain full and fair disclosure
of:
(i) The terms of the offering, including the extent and
nature of the Sponsor's commitment and its ability
to satisfy such commitment;
(ii) The risks associated with the Sponsor's commitment;
(iii) The Termination Date of the offering; and
(iv) The maximum level of potential purchases of securities
or loans by the Sponsor; and
d. Any purchases by the Sponsor are for investment and
not resale and the offering materials must so state.
B. Offerings with no Stated Contingency
Where the terms of the offering do not provide for sale of a
Specified Minimum prior to a Specified Date or return of funds to
investors, and the Sponsor commits at the commencement of the
offering to purchase on the Termination Date any securities remain-
ing unsold or sufficient securities to reach a certain amount specified
in the terms of the offering, provided that the conditions specified
in paragraphs 3(a)-(d) above are also met, the offering will not be
deemed to be contingent so as to cause rules lOb-9 and 15c2-4(b)
to apply.
C. Discount Purchases
In offerings subject to rules lOb-9 and 15c2-4, the issuer may
offer to sell securities on special terms, for example offer to sell
securities net of commissions or provide for volume discounts, as
long as (a) such varied terms are offered uniformly to persons in a
certain specified class or classes, and (b) such terms are fully disclosed
in the offering materials. 88
The staff indicated that the procedures described in part A above modify
the Homer letter by permitting a general partner to undertake at the time of
88. Id.
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an interim closing to purchase all units which remain unsold at the termi-
nation date of an offering. The most significant conditions are that the
Specified Minimum must be sold in bona fide transactions before the Interim
Closing;8 9 that the sponsor unconditionally agree that it will either purchase
unsold interests for investment on the offering's termination or loan the
partnership all or a specified portion of the unsold interests' purchase price
(either at the Interim Closing or at the Termination Date); and that the
offering materials contain a full and fair disclosure of the arrangement,
including the extent and nature of the sponsor's commitment, its ability to
satisfy the commitment, the risks associated with its commitment, and the
maximum level of potential purchases. Presumably Homer proposal 1,
which envisioned that the General Partner could loan funds to reach the
designated minimum, would still be considered a violation of rule lOb-9
under the American Bar Association opinion letter, even though the loan for
unsold units in excess of the Specified Minimum is approved.
Disclosure of the risks associated with the general partner's commitment
must depend of course on the facts of a particular offering. In many
situations, the risks associated with substantial purchases of interests by the
general partner will include the following:
1. As a holder of limited partnership interests, the general partner
is likely to have interests which conflict with those of other limited
partners. If the general partner is required to purchase a substan-
tial number of limited partnership interests, it may have an interest
in a sale or refinancing of the partnership's assets earlier than
would the other investors.
2. Substantial purchases of limited partnership interests by the gen-
eral partner may limit the ability of the other limited partners to
exercise voting rights granted by the partnership agreement.
3. Substantial purchases of limited partnership interests by the gen-
eral partner may limit the general partner's financial capacity to
fulfill other financial obligations to or on behalf of the partner-
ship.
Part B of the Task Force procedures, "Offerings with no Stated Contin-
gency," is intended to modify Roger C. Hartman, Esq. (Urban Improvement
Fund Ltd.-1975), in which the staff had indicated that rule lOb-9 would
89. See id. Paragraph 2 of part A of the Task Force procedures contains a reference to
the securities having been "fully paid for with customer funds that have cleared the banking
system," but this should not be read to mean that the funds must have cleared the banking system
by the Specified Date. The staff previously has indicated that subscriptions received by a selling
broker on the last day of an offering period may be counted if the "prompt transmittal" guidelines
of NASD Notice to Members 84-64 are followed, the checks deposited in the escrow account
clear the banking system, and the suitability of the investor has been determined. See Robbins,
All-or-None Offerings, supra note 35, at nn. 34-37.
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not apply to an offering when the general partner undertook at the com-
mencement of the offering to purchase all unsold units upon termination of
the offering, regardless of the number of units sold. 90 The staff's new position
simply subjects such offerings to the same substantive and disclosure require-
ments described in part A(3)(a)-(d).
Part C also modifies a recent staff position that purchases by persons
entitled to purchase securities net of brokerage commissions must be at the
full purchase price with a rebate of the commissions after closing. 9' Such
sales net of brokerage commissions, or at volume discounts, may now be
made at the discounted price if (a) the varied terms are offered uniformly to
persons in a certain specified class or classes, and (b) the terms are fully
disclosed in the offering materials. In telephone advice provided to a repre-
sentative of the ABA Task Force, the staff made it clear clear that such
purchases may be counted in determining whether a designated minimum
sales level has been achieved. 92
3. Changes in Offering Terms
Rule lOb-9 has been interpreted to require a high degree of specificity in
the terms of an offering. A change in a material term of an offering is in
effect a termination of the offering as originally made, and requires that
investors' funds be returned. The staff has taken the position that any of
the following changes in the terms of an offering subject to rule lOb-9 is in
effect a termination of the offering as to all previous investors and requires
that all proceeds be returned to the investors:
I. Extension of the offering period.
2. Change in the offering price.
3. Change in the minimum purchase required of investors.
4. Change in the amount of proceeds necessary to release proceeds
in escrow.
5. Change in the application of proceeds. 9
The staff has permitted offerings to be extended beyond the initial
offering period only if the following procedure is followed:
90. Urban Improvement Fund Limited-1975, supra note 74. See supra notes 74, 82
(discussing Urban Improvement Fund Ltd.-1975 interpretive letter).
91. See Bergmann, Contingency Offerings, supra note 38, at § A.4.C.
92. Telephone advice to Linda Wertheimer by Larry Bergmann, Assistant Director,
Division of Market Regulation, Securities and Exchange Commission (April 1986).
93. See Bergmann, Contingency Offerings, supra note 38; Scarff, Developments in Trading
Practices, supra note 46, at 471 (extension of offering period); Tucson Hotel Associates (March
12, 1985) (SEC staff interpretive letter regarding extension of offering); Reliance Trust Company
(July 25, 1985) (SEC staff interpretive letter).
19861
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
1. A reconfirmation offer must be made to all subscribers prior to
the specified expiration date. The reconfirmation offer must
disclose the extension and any other material information neces-
sary to update the prospectus disclosure in order to permit
subscribers to make an informed new investment decision.
2. The reconfirmation offer must be structured so that the subscriber
affirmatively elects to continue his investment and those subscri-
bers who take no affirmative action will have their subscriptions
returned.
3. In order to comply with the requirement of rule 15c2-4 that
funds held in escrow pending a stated event or contingency be
promptly returned if the stated event or contingency does not
occur, the reconfirmation offer must be made far enough in
advance of the initial expiration date so that a subscriber who
does not reconfirm will have his funds returned promptly after
the initial expiration date.94
The same procedure would apply in a public or private offering. In a
public offering, the offering may proceed by post-effective amendment rather
than a new registration statement, although in any case except an extension
of the offering period, funds must actually be returned to investors before
the reconfirmation offer. 95
4. What Sales May be Counted; "Last Day Sales"
Rule lOb-9 requires both that the specified amount of securities be
"sold" within a specified time and that the total amount due to the seller
be received by the seller by a specified date. When a selling broker receives
subscriptions on the last day of the offering period, but not deposited in
escrow on that day, may the subscriptions be counted toward the required
minimum? The staff has indicated that such subscriptions may be counted,
96
so long as the "prompt transmittal" guidelines of NASD Notice to Members
84-64 are followed, 97 but this does not mean that the escrow can be released
immediately.
94. Release No. 6455, supra note 69, at Question 80; Scarff, Developments in Trading
Practices, supra note 46, at 471-72. In Contingency Offerings: Escrow Accounts and Related
Matters, Bergmann indicates that "extension of the offering period is the only situation involving
a change in the terms of the offering in which the staff deems such a reconfirmation procedure
to be appropriate," but provides no reason why more should be required in the case of, for
example, a change in the minimum purchase required of investors. Bergmann, Contingency
Offerings, supra note 38. The staff specifically has refused to permit the reconfirmation
procedure when the sponsor proposed to reduce the level of minimum subscriptions required
for closing. Tucson Hotel Assoc. (Mar. 12, 1985) (SEC interpretive letter).
95. See Tucson Hotel Assoc. (Mar. 12, 1985) (SEC interpretive letter).
96. Bergmann, Contingency Offerings, supra note 38.
97. See supra note 38 (discussing prompt transmittal guidelines).
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All checks deposited in the escrow account must have cleared the banking
system and represent immediately available funds for the securities to be
"fully paid" within the meaning of Securities Exchange Act Release No.
11532.98 Further, to the extent that the offering requires a suitability deter-
mination (or, in the case of an offering under Regulation D, an accreditation
determination) by the managing broker-dealer or sponsor, subscriptions may
not be counted until the investor's suitability has been determined. 99
5. Refunds of Subscriptions
On failure of the conditions to an offering, rule lOb-9 requires that "all
or a specified amount" of investors' subscriptions be promptly refunded. If
less than all of an investor's subscription may be refunded, the minimum
amount that will be refunded must be stated in the offering memorandum.
The risks to which subscriptions may be subject should not include the
form of investment of the escrow account. Offerings made through NASD
member broker-dealers are required to comply with NASD Notice to Mem-
bers 84-7 (January 30, 1984) with respect to investment of escrow accounts.
To the extent that an offering is not required to, and does not comply with
the investment guidelines, there should be an appropriate risk factor dealing
with risk of loss of the proceeds.
C. Remaining Issues
While the American Bar Association letter represents a substantial ad-
vance by the staff in taking a reasoned, disclosure-oriented approach to rule
lOb-9, the principal remaining problem area is the need to clarify that
purchases, to be bona fide for purposes of rule lOb-9, need be made "for
investment" only in a private offering. In a public offering, rule 10b-9
requires only that a purchaser "take the risk of the investment," not that
he purchase "for investment." 100 This clarification is essential to prevent
certain references in the Homer interpretive letter from creating substantial
uncertainty and disruption of public offerings subject to rule 10b-9.
IV. INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OFFERINGS
A. Regulation T
Section 7(c) of the '34 Act makes it unlawful for any broker or dealer
"to extend or maintain credit or arrange for the extension or maintenance
98. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,730 (July 11, 1975). See Chris Anderson (March 29,
1984) (SEC staff interpretive letter); supra note 42 (quoting Exchange Act Release No. 11532).
A broker may not substitute its own funds for those of a customer whose check has been
dishonored. See Roald George Gregersen, 46 S.E.C. 387 (1976). It is clearly contrary to rule
lOb-9 to close on the basis of checks which the broker knows will not be honored. SEC v.
Manor Nursing Center, 340 F. Supp. 913, 934-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), modified, 458 F.2d 1082
(2d Cir. 1972).
99. Bergmann, Contingency Offerings, supra note 38, at § A.4.e.
100. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-9 (1986). See supra note 40 (quoting Rule 10b-9).
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of credit to or for any customer" on any security in contravention of the
margin rules adopted by the Federal Reserve Board.' °' Section 220.13 of the
Board's Regulation T,'0 2 issued by the Board pursuant to its regulatory
authority under section 7(a) of the '34 Act, provides in part as follows:
A creditor [broker or dealer] may not arrange for the extension or
maintenance of credit to or for any customer by any person upon
terms and conditions other than those upon which the creditor may
itself extend or maintain under the provisions of this part, except
that this limitation shall not apply to credit arranged for a customer
which does not violate parts 207 and 221 of this chapter and results
solely from:
(a) [investment banking services]; or
(b) the sale of nonmargin securities (including securities with install-
ment or other deferred payment provisions) if the sale is ex-
3mpted from the registration requirements of the Securities Act
of 1933 under section 4(2) or section 4(6) of the Act.' 3
Regulation T generally provides that a securities customer must pay at
least 50 percent of the price of any "margin security"' 4 purchased.0 5
Securities that are not margin securities, including most securities issued in
private offerings, may not be the subject of an extension of credit, or an
arranging for the extension of credit, by a broker or dealer.'
°6
A tax shelter program that provides for installment payments of the sale
price of the interests purchased, but permits a customer to obtain the entire
benefit of ownership before making all of the payments, has been interpreted
by the Federal Reserve Board to be a prohibited "arranging for the extension
of credit to purchase or carry securities" in violation of section 220.13.07
Neither the SEC nor the Federal Reserve Board until recently had
articulated clear guidelines for determining when a provision for deferred
payment, or a provision for assuming or incurring indebtedness constitutes
"arranging for the extension of credit." Interpretive rulings of the Federal
Reserve Board staff, however, appear to indicate that a provision for deferred
payment generally will not be considered to constitute an extension of credit
if (1) the deferred payment is made to purchase a "new" or separate security,
(2) failure to make the deferred payment would not result in a forfeiture of
101. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c) (1982).
102. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-220.18 (1986).
103. Id. § 220.13 (emphasis added).
104. Margin securities generally are securities registered on a national securities exchange
and certain over-the-counter securities.
105. 12 C.F.R. § 220.18 (1986).
106. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.4(b), 220.18(0 (1986).
107. 12 C.F.R. § 220.124 (1986); FEDERAL RESERvE BOARD, SECURITIES CREDIT TRANSAC-
TION HANDBOOK J 5-470 [hereinafter cited as SCTH].
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the investor's existing interest, and (3) the amount and timing of the deferred
payment are truly contingent so that it may be considered a "bona fide
contingent assessment." '  These three principles overlap substantially and
are emphasized separately depending on the facts of each case.1,9
B. Application of Regulation T to Offerings under Regulation D
Securities offerings that are exempt under section 4(2) (private place-
ments), or section 4(6) (small business offerings) of the 1933 Act are exempt
from the application of Regulation T.1° The private placement exemption
from Regulation T is available for offerings that comply with either rule
505 or rule 506 under Regulation D.1' The Federal Reserve Board staff has
refused to extend the exemption from Regulation T to offerings made
pursuant to rule 504, however, on the ground that the SEC has not
characterized rule 504 offerings as private offerings."' Consequently, a
broker or dealer may arrange for the extension of credit, such as an
installment sale or deferred payment provision, in connection with a private
placement of securities under rule 505 or 506, but not an offering under
rule 504.
C. Section 11(d) of the 1934 Act
In addition to the provisions of section 7(c) of the 1934 Act and
Regulation T, section 1 l(d)(1) of the '34 Act prohibits a broker-dealer from
108. See infra note 109 (citing interpretive rulings of Federal Reserve Board staff).
109. See SCTH, supra note 107, 5-607 (Fed. Res. Bd. Staff Op., May 31, 1972) (contingent
assessment permitted in oil and gas program when payment of assessment would provide interest
in wells drilled after certain date as "security separate from the assessable interest"); id. 5-
606.17 (Fed. Res. Bd. Staff Op., Dec. 23, 1981) (when only consequence of failure to pay
assessment is pro rata reduction of investor's interest to amount actually paid, there is no
prohibited arranging for credit, but when failure to pay assessment also makes investor's interest
nontransferable, economic penalty for nonpayment violates Regulation T); id. 5-560 (Fed. Res.
Bd. Staff Op., Oct. 30, 1973) (when limited partnership interests are sold coupled with warrant
to purchase additional interests, if "the economic penalty for non-exercise of the warrant (when
weighed against the new investment required) is such that the purchaser of the first interest
would not have a genuine choice as to whether or not to put up the money for the second
interest," there would be prohibited extension of credit); id. 1 5-608 (Fed. Res. Bd. Staff Op.,
July 10, 1972 (bona fide contingent assessments permitted even though they would be legally
enforceable when called); id. 5-607 (Fed. Res. Bd. Staff Op., May 31, 1972) (same).
110. 12 C.F.R. § 220.13 (1986). See SCTH, supra note 107, 5-606.12 (Fed. Res. Bd. Staff
Op., Apr. 1, 1981) (§ 4(6)); id. 5-598 (Fed. Res. Bd. Staff Op., Mar. 29, 1979) (§ 4(2)); id.
5-595 (Fed. Res. Bd. Staff Op., Sept. 13, 1978) (§ 4(2)).
111. Revision of Certain Exemptions From Registration for Transactions Involving Limited
Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11251, 11258 n.33 (1982);
SCTH, supra note 107, 5-606.19 (Fed. Res. Bd. Staff Op., Apr. 1, 1982) (RULE 505); id.
5-606.18 (Fed. Res. Bd. Staff Op., Jan. 8, 1982) (Rule 506).
112. SCTH, supra note 107, 5-606.2 (Fed. Res. Bd. Staff. Op., May 20, 1982). See
Interpretive Release on Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 6455, 48 Fed. Reg. 10045,
10054, nn. 50-51 (1983).
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arranging for the extension of credit in connection with a "new issue."
Section 11 (d)(1) provides in pertinent part that
[i]t shall be unlawful for a member of a national securities exchange
who is both a dealer and a broker, or for any person who both as
a broker and a dealer transacts a business in securities through the
medium of a member or otherwise, to effect through the use of any
facility of a national securities exchange or of the mails or of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or otherwise in the
case of a member, (1) any transaction in connection with which,
directly or indirectly, he extends or maintains or arranges for the ex-
tension or maintenance of credit to or for a customer on any security
(other than an exempted security) which was a part of a new issue
in the distribution of which he participated as a member of a selling
syndicate or group within thirty days prior to such transaction.... 11 3
For a transaction to violate section 11(d)(1), it must be effected by one
who acts both as a broker and a dealer, in connection with a "new issue in
the distribution of which he participated as a member of the selling syndicate
or group." '" 4 One who acts only as a broker, and not as a dealer, does not
come within the prohibition. ,5
D. Application of Section 11(d)(1) to Offerings under Regulation D
Section 1 1(d)(1) does not contain an exemption for offerings exempt
from the registration provisions of the 1933 Act, as does Regulation T.
However, the SEC staff has taken the position that if no public market exists
for the securities, and the offering does not constitute a "public distribution"
(which term is not defined), it will not recommend any action under that
section." 6 The Federal Reserve Board Staff has taken the position that it has
no responsibility for interpretation of section 1 1(d)(1)."'
The staff of the Commission's Division of Market Regulation has not
provided any written advice regarding the application of section 1 l(d)(1) to
113. 15 U.S.C. § 78k(d)(l) (1982).
114. Id.
115. See Saul, Ewing, Remick & Saul, SEC No-Action Letter [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,564 (Nov. 12, 1973); State of Ohio, Dept. of Commerce Division of
Securities, SEC No-Action Letter [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 79,558
(Oct. 27, 1973).
116. See Saul, Ewing, Remick & Saul, SEC No-Action Letter [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,564 (Nov. 12, 1973); Great Plains Western Corp. (avail. Dec. 9,
1973) (SEC no-action letter). The staff took the following position in Great Plains Western
Corp.:
It is our view ... that section 11(d)(1) does not apply to transactions which do not
constitute a distribution of securities to the public .... The ultimate responsibility
for determining whether a particular offering of securities constitutes a distribution
to the public for purposes of section 11(d)(1) must rest with the issuer.
Great Plains Western Corp. (avail. Dec. 9, 1973) (SEC no-action letter).
117. SCTH, supra note 107, 5-606.16 (Fed. Res. Bd. Staff Op., Dec. 4, 1981); id. 5-606.15
(Fed. Res. Bd. Staff Op., April 17, 1981).
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offerings made pursuant to Regulation D. The staff has given oral advice
that it would mirror the interpretations of the Federal Reserve Board staff
under Regulation T regarding the type of transactions that would constitute
"arranging for the extension of credit" and also has given oral advice that
offerings made pursuant to rule 505 and rule 506, but not rule 504, would
be exempt from the application of section 1 1(d)(1).
E. Current Developments
1. The Adoption of Rule 3a12-9
On March 7, 1986, the SEC adopted rule 3a12-91' that grants the
exemptions from sections 7(c) and 1 l(d)(1) of the '34 Act presently enjoyed
by private offerings under rules 505 and 506 under Regulation D to publicly
offered securities of certain direct participation programs, provided that
certain conditions are met.119 Consequently, broker-dealers can participate in
public offerings of securities for direct participation programs that feature
mandatory deferred payments provided that:
(1) The securities are registered under the 1933 Act or are sold or
offered exclusively on an intrastate basis in reliance upon section
3(a)(1 1) of the 1933 Act;
(2) The mandatory deferred payments bear a reasonable relationship
to the capital needs and program objectives described in a
business development plan disclosed to investors in a registration
statement filed with the Commission under the 1933 Act or,
where no registration statement is required to be filed with the
Commission, as part of a statement filed with the relevant state
securities administrator;
(3) Not less than 50 percent of the purchase price of the direct
participation program security is paid by the investor at the time
of sale; and
(4) The total purchase price of the direct participation program
security is due within three years in specified property programs
or two years in non-specified property programs. Such pay-in
periods are to be measured from the earlier of the completion
118. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-9 (1986).
119. Exemption of Certain Direct Participation Program Securities, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-22979, 51 Fed. Reg. 8795 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Exchange Act Release No. 34-
22979].
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of the offering, or one year following the effective date of the
offering. ,20
In SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-22979 (rule 3a12-9 release), the
Commission defined "direct participation programs" to exclude securities
listed on exchanges or quoted on NASDAQ during the pay-in period as a
result of efforts by the issuer, underwriter, or other participants in the initial
distribution of such securities, reasoning that such securities raise price
volatility and speculation concerns that are central to the margin regula-
tions.
12'
In the rule 3a12-9 release, the Commission placed special emphasis on
the requirement that installment payments "reasonably" be related to the
capital needs and business objectives of the program. The SEC made it clear
that it would be necessary to coordinate payments so that they bear a
reasonable relationship to substantive program events or capital needs.
Consequently, programs that intend at the offering's outset to factor, or
otherwise assign investor notes to raise capital for purchasing property or
meeting program objectives before receipt of the deferred payments cannot
rely on rule 3a12-9.' 22
Since the securities governed by rule 3a12-9 normally are sold in
contingency offerings, the release contained guidelines for compliance with
rule 1Ob-9 (requiring specificity in terms) and rule 15c2-4 (addressing the
handling of investors' funds by broker-dealers) that both cover such offer-
ings. According to the rule 3a12-9 release, rule lOb-9 would be satisfied,
and the consideration' may be released to the issuer, only when: (1) the
specified sales level is achieved; (2) with respect to the sale of each security
counted towards the specified sales level, the 50% down payment is fully
paid; and (3) the required documentation reflecting the installment payment
obligations comports with the requirements of the offering material.
24
Rule 3a12-9, however, does not provide the exclusive method by which
deferred payments can be included in public offerings. A number of different
structures have been approved by the Federal Reserve Board staff as not in
120. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a12-9 (1986). "Business Development Plan" is defined as one which
describes the program's anticipated economic development and the amounts of future capital
contributions, in the form of mandatory deferred payments, to be required at specified times
or upon the occurrence of certain events. Id. § 240.3a12-9(b)(2). "Specified Property Program"
is defined as a direct participation program in which, at the date of effectiveness, more than 75
percent of the net proceeds from the sale of program securities are committed to specific
purchases or expenditures. Id. § 240.3a12-9(b)(3).
121. Exchange Act Release No. 34-22979, supra note 119.
122. Id. According to the release, however, it will be permissible to use investor notes as
collateral to secure program debt. Id. at 8799. The line between the permissible and the
impermissible is therefore somewhat unclear. Id.
123. Id. The consideration in a "direct participation program" would be the 50 percent
down payment and the documentation reflecting the contractual obligation of the investor to




conflict with Regulation T, and for those types of offering no exemption is
required.12'
Compliance with rule 15c2-4 requires that any consideration received by
a broker-dealer in a rule 3a12-9 offering before the satisfaction of the
contingencies be deposited promptly by the broker-dealer in a separate bank
account as agent or trustee for the persons who have the beneficial interests
therein, or promptly transmitted to a bank that has agreed in writing to hold
all such consideration in escrow for the persons who have the beneficial
interests therein. Finally, the Commission made it clear that rule 3a12-9
does not preempt state securities laws. Accordingly, those securities that
qualify under rule 3a12-9 also must comply with applicable state laws.
2. Proposed NASAA Amendments
In a related development, the North American Securities Administrators
Association, Inc. (NASAA) 26 has proposed amendments to its guides for
registration of real estate programs that for the first time would permit in
limited cases mandatory deferred payments for certain non-specified program
interests in public offerings.' 27 Under the proposed amendments the sponsor
must satisfy an administrator that the mandatory deferred payment provi-
sions bear "a reasonable and demonstrable relationship to the capital needs
and program objectives described in the business development plan disclosed
to investors.' ' 2 In addition, 50 percent of the purchase price of the program
interests would have to be paid by the investor at the time of the sale, with
the remainder payable within two years of the earlier of the end of the
offering or one year following the effective date of the offering, or within a
shorter period specified by the state securities administrator. 1
2 9
The proposed amendments also prescribe new requirements for manda-
tory deferred payments for specified programs, which would be equally
applicable to non-specified programs. They include the requirements that:
(1) at least 50 percent of the purchase price of the program
interests be paid by the investor at the time of sale, with the rest to
be paid within three years of the earlier of the completion of the
offering, or one year following the effective date of the offering;
(2) selling commissions for program interests sold on a manda-
tory deferred payment basis be paid only on a pro rata basis as cash
payments are made by participants;
125. See supra note 109 (discussing alternative forms of deferred payments).
126. NASAA is a voluntary organization comprised of state securities regulatory agencies,
which issues guidelines that are adopted by many states. See NASAA Rep. (CCH) 1-6, at 11-
15 (1986).
127. See id. 3609, at 2041 (NASAA Statement of Policy re: mandatory deferred payments
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(3) responses to defaults be designed to protect the capital
requirements of the program and the best interests of the non-
defaulting participants;
(4) any security interest taken by the program in the participant's
program interests be in proportion to the ratio as the unpaid face
value of the promissory notes given by the participant bears to the
total face value of such notes;
(5) non-defaulting participants (other than the sponsor) be given
the right of first refusal to purchase program interests recovered as
a result of a default in payments, unless mandatory deferred pay-
ments are guaranteed by the sponsor or by a surety bond or other
arrangement; and
(6) notification be given by the sponsor to an assignee or trans-
feree of program interests purchased through a deferred payment
program of the material terms of the mandatory deferred payment
obligation.130
The NASAA guidelines serve as guides for use by state securities officials
in reviewing registration statements and have no further substantive effect.
Certain requirements, such as NASAA guideline (3) (requiring that responses
to defaults be designed to protect the interests of non-defaulting participants
and the capital requirements of the program), will have substantive content
only in the context of accumulated decisions of state securities officials on
individual programs. In practice, the interpretation of the guidelines from
state to state generally has been uneven, and it remains to be seen what types
of offering structures generally will be approved.
130. Id. at 2039-40.
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